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MEMORANDUM FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS

ISSUE: ANALYZE THE PRACTICAL DIFFERENCES AND ISSUES, IF ANY, IN PROSECUTING THE CRIMES
OF AIDING THE ENEMY UNDER ARTICLE 104 OF THE UCMJ, TREASON, AND MATERIAL SUPPORT
FOR TERRORISM. HAS THE OFFENSE OF "MATERIAL SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM," AS DEFINED IN THE
MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2009 (10 U.S.C. § 950 T (27)), BEEN TRIED BY U.S. MILITARY
COMMISSIONS OR FOREIGN MILITARY TRIBUNALS ENFORCING THE LAW OF WAR? PLEASE CONSIDER
WHETHER THE UCMJ/MCA CRIME OF “AIDING THE ENEMY” 1) IS COMPARABLE TO ANY
INTERNATIONAL OFFENSES; 2) ANALYZE THE PRACTICAL DIFFERENCES AND ISSUES , IF ANY, IN
PROSECUTING THE CRIMES OF AIDING THE ENEMY (UNDER ARTICLE 104 OF THE UCMJ) AND
TREASON; 3) IS A DUTY OF ALLEGIANCE NECESSARY TO PROSECUTE SOMEONE FOR THE UCMJ
CRIME (ARTICLE 104) OF AIDING THE ENEMY; 4) BASED ON THE LANGUAGE OF THE OFFENSE
CONTAINED IN THE UCMJ AND MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (GOVERNED BY EXECUTIVE
ORDER), CAN “ANY PERSON” REGARDLESS OF MILITARY STATUS ACTUALLY BE PROSECUTED IN A
COURT MARTIAL FOR AIDING THE ENEMY UNDER UCMJ ARTICLE 104; AND 5) ANALYZE THE
FEASIBILITY OF A PROSECUTOR IN A MILITARY COMMISSION CHARGING AN ALIEN WITH ARTICLE
104 OF THE UCMJ, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CONSIDERATION OF WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A DUTY
OF ALLEGIANCE.
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INTRODUCTION
5

A. Scope
This paper seeks to analyze the practical differences and issues, if any, in
prosecuting the crimes of Aiding the Enemy under Article 104 of the UCMJ, Treason
and Material Support for Terrorism. The paper will consider whether the offense of
"material support for terrorism," as defined in the Military Commissions Act of 2009 has
been tried by U.S. military commissions or foreign military tribunals enforcing the law of
war. It will consider whether the crime of “Aiding the Enemy” is comparable to any
international offenses and analyze the practical differences and issues, if any, in
prosecuting the crimes of Aiding the Enemy and Treason. It will also review whether a
duty of allegiance is necessary to prosecute someone for the UCMJ crime of Aiding the
Enemy. In addition, this paper will discuss whether “any person” regardless of military
status can be prosecuted in a court martial for Aiding the Enemy under UCMJ Article
104 based on the language of the offense contained in the UCMJ and Manual for
Courts-Martial. It will indirectly analyze the feasibility of a prosecutor in a military
commission charging an alien with Article 104 of the UCMJ, taking into account whether
or not there is a duty of allegiance.
B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Difficulties in statutory interpretation have long been problematic
for those charged with prosecuting the crime of Treason. The courts
have struggled to define what constitutes Treason by levying war
and what constitutes Treason by adhering to enemies specifically
giving them aid and comfort. Treason may successfully be
prosecuted under either the levying war or aid and comfort parts of
the statute.
2. The UCMJ Section 104 crime of Aiding the Enemy is a distinct,
albeit related crime, from the crime of Treason. Aiding the Enemy,
unlike Treason, has no built in duty of allegiance requirement
6

required to prosecute. The newer Congressionally created crime
“Wrongfully Aiding the Enemy” explicitly mandates an allegiance of
duty requirement missing in the Aiding the Enemy crime, defining
that allegiance as citizenship, resident alien status, or a contractual
relationship in or with the United States supporting the
aforementioned conclusion through this distinction.
3. The Military commissions only have jurisdiction for war crimes or
crimes under the Law of War. Material Support for Terrorism under
the Military Commission Acts of 2006 and 2009 is not a war crime
and therefore prosecutors should not be able to prosecute by
military tribunals.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

A Brief history of the crime of Treason

Treason was prosecuted in early England mainly under the offense of
compassing the King's death, while other cases focused on the problem of Treason by
levying war 1. The United States also has a long history of prosecuting the crime of
Treason. In 1794, the “Whiskey Rebellion” occurred in Pennsylvania in resistance to a
tax on spirits. A number of the participants were charged with Treason. 2
B.

History of Aiding the Enemy and Divergence from Treason

1. Prosecuting the crime of Aiding the Enemy within the U.S. context dates back to
1775. In Hicks, the defense noted that the crimes of Aiding the Enemy was enacted by

1

Jabez W. Loane, IV, Treason and Aiding the Enemy, 30 Mil. L. Rev. 43 (1965) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 32].
2 The Whiskey Rebellion, or Whiskey Insurrection, was a tax protest in the United States beginning in 1791, during
the presidency of George Washington. The so-called "whiskey tax" was the first tax imposed on a domestic product
by the newly formed federal government. It became law in 1791 and was intended to generate revenue to help
reduce the national debt. Id at 55[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

7

the first U.S. Congress in 1760. The Act was often referred to as relating to the crime of
Treason. 3
2. However, Congress, as shown later, specifically intended to separate Treason from
Aiding the Enemy. This Congressional intent culminated when Congress included
Article 104 within the original United Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) in 1950. Thus,
Aiding the Enemy under Article 104 is a separate offense, with distinct elements, from
Treason.
C.

Background on the crime of Wrongfully Aiding the Enemy

Congress also gave prosecutors a newer charge under the MMC called “Wrongfully
Aiding the Enemy. While this version follows the same general statutory guidelines as
its UCMJ counterpart, the MMC requires an additional element absent from UCMJ
Article 104. The MMC requires prosecutors a breach of an allegiance or duty to the
United States, defining that allegiance as “citizenship, resident alien status, or a
contractual relationship in or with the United States 4.”

D.

Origin and Evolution of Material Support for Terrorism

1. Non-Military Prosecution of Material Support for Terrorism. The term material
support first appeared in federal legislation in the 1990 Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA). While domestic law already excluded aliens from the United States who “engage
in terrorist activity,” INA expanded this scope. Under the INA, it was now permissible to

3

U.S v Hicks, 2004 WL 3088462 (2004) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24].
Manual for Military Commissions, 10 U.S.C § 47 A, April 27, 2010 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab
9].
4
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exclude an alien from the United States if that individual had committed an act of
providing material support to a terrorist organization. 5
2. Military Prosecution of Material Support for Terrorism. In 2006, the United States
categorized Material Support for Terrorism as a war crime with Congress's passage of
the Military Commissions Act (MCA), codified in Title 10 of the United States Code 6.

III.

LEGAL DISCUSSION

A. Treason
1. Definition of Treason
Treason is defined under the US Code as whoever, owing allegiance to the
United States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and
comfort within the United States or elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death,
or shall be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this title but not less than
$10,000; and shall be incapable of holding any office under the United States. 7

2. Prosecuting early Treason under the levying war requirement.
a. Early England Treason and the Whiskey Rebellion

5

Immigration and Nationality Act, 104 Stat. 4978, November 29, 1990 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 6].
6
Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948a, 2006[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10].
7
Crime of Treason, 18 U.S. Code § 2381 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 4].
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While the vast majority of the early English Treason trials were concerned with
the offense of compassing the King's death 8, some addressed the problem of Treason
by levying war. Where the former was relatively straightforward, the latter forced the
development of at least rudimentary legal concepts which could be applied with some
level of consistency. The construction of compassing the King's demise still played a
part in prosecution, but an increasingly minor role. The United States faced a similar
situation in its history and treatment of Treason. In 1794, the “Whiskey Rebellion”
started up in Pennsylvania in resistance to a tax on spirits. Federal officers were
threatened and assaulted. In July 1794, a mob attacked the home of the chief excise
officer which was defended by a number of men. Subsequently, the mob, in a show of
force, marched through Pittsburgh. A number of the participants were apprehended and
charged with Treason. Only two persons, however, were actually brought to trial. 9
b. Mitchell and Frees: role in the history of the crime of Treason
In Mitchell, the defense contended that the attack on the officer's home was an
attack on him as an individual and not in his role as an officer of the United States and
that there was not an attempt to resist the law on a nationwide scale 10. The argument
was that this was merely a riot, not Treason. The honorable Justice Paterson reasoned
that if the object of the insurrection was to suppress the officers and to prevent the
execution of an act of congress by force and intimidation the offense is high Treason by
levying of war. 11 The court ruled if the Whiskey Rebels showed a determined effort to

8

Jabez W. Loane, IV, Treason and Aiding the Enemy, 30 Mil. L. Rev. 43 (1965) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 32].
9
Id at 57.
10
U.S v Mitchell, 2 U.S. 348 (1795) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 26].
11
Loane, supra note 1, at 56 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].

10

oppose an act of Congress, those of the North Hampton Insurgents did not. 12 In 1799,
John Fries led over 100 men to free a group of farmers being held by United States
marshals for conspiracy to violate the Land Tax Act. 13 The mob arrived at a tavern
where the prisoners were being held, threatened the marshals, and secured the
farmers’ release. However, John Fries was subsequently tried for Treason. The court
found him guilty under the same reasoning as Mitchell. Although revolution was still a
real fear, it is difficult to understand why Fries could have been convicted of levying war.
Measured against the facts, Fries' conduct appears fragmentary and insignificant. If this
had been Treason, then almost any riot or disorder involving opposition to a law of the
United States can be construed as Treason. However, Fries was eventually pardoned.
c. Hanivay
The effect of Mitchell persisted until the 1851 decision in United States v.
Hanivay 14. Hanivay had aided one of several armed bands advocating resistance to the
fugitive slave law. In the immediate violence out of which the case arose, a slave owner
was killed, his son wounded, and police officers were attacked. Justice Grier, professing
that he saw a change in the legal definition of “levying war” believed that the term
levying war, should be confined to insurrection and rebellions for the purpose of
overthrowing the government by force and arms. The court reasoned that this was not
an insurrection meant to overthrow the government and found Hanivay not guilty. Many

12

Id at 57 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
Id [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
14
Us v Hanivay [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
13
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of the cases of Treason mentioned would perhaps now be treated merely as aggravated
felonies after this case.
3. Prosecuting Treason under the Adhering to the Enemy prong of the
statute

a. Explanation of adhering to the enemy
Unlike the offense of Treason by levying war which passed from the scene
almost a hundred years ago, the offense of Treason by adhering to the enemy has
achieved a longer and more useful existence. Adhering to the enemy encompasses
both aiding and giving comfort to the enemy. With these elements, the problem of intent
is intertwined. A citizen may intellectually, emotionally and spiritually sympathize with
the enemy, but as long as he fails to engage in conduct designed to give the enemy aid
and comfort, the crime of Treason does not occur. 15 The mere fact that it is offered or
rendered with the requisite intent will make the crime complete.
b. Difficulties in interpreting the aid and comfort requirement of
Treason
i.

Haupt and Chandler

The World War II propagandist cases mention levying war only in passing basing
their decisions on the adhering prong. However, the courts have had great difficulty
explaining what aid and comfort to a propagandist provides, by way of either benefit to
the enemy or detriment to the United States. In earlier decisions applying the phrase
“aid and comfort,” courts faced clearer cases in which the defendants provided concrete

15

Kristen Eichensehra, Treasons Return, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 229 (2007) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 29].
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aid and comfort to the enemy. For example, in Haupt v. United States, the Supreme
Court upheld the Treason conviction of the father of one of the Quirin 16 saboteurs who,
with full knowledge and endorsement of his son's mission of sabotage, supplied him
with housing, food, transportation, and employment in the United States 17. In Chandler,
the question considered was what aid and comfort do words with no actions provide.
The court answered based on the facts that the appearance of an American citizen on
an enemy radio program would demoralize U.S. troops in the field, thereby giving aid to
the United States' enemies finding the American citizen guilty under the adhering prong.
But the courts have held that the criminality of a U.S. citizen's production of enemy
propaganda does not depend on the effects of that propaganda. As the court reasoned
in Chandler v. United States, “it makes no difference how many persons in the United
States heard or heeded Chandler's broadcasts.” 18
c. Interpreting Gadahn and the propaganda requirement in the
adhering prong
In October 2006, the Department of Justice indicted Adam Gadahn on charges of
Treason and giving Material Support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. 19
The indictment alleged that Gadahn, an American citizen, “knowingly adhered to an
enemy of the United States, al-Qaeda, and gave al-Qaeda aid and comfort with the
intent to betray the United States.” Gadahn allegedly betrayed the United States by
appearing in al Qaeda videos in which he spoke against the United States, praised the

16

Ex-parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 27].
Haupt v. U.S, 330 U.S. 631 (1947) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23].
18
U.S v. Chandler, 171 F.2d 921 (1948) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 20].
19
U.S v. Gadahn, C.D. Cal. Oct. 11 (2006) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
17
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September 11 attacks, and touted al Qaeda's ability to attack again. Because Gadahn's
alleged crimes consisted solely of participating in propaganda videos, his case is similar
to the last wave of treason prosecutions of American civilians, many of which targeted
citizens who served as propagandists for Germany and Japan during World War II. The
indictment against Gadahn follows the World War II Treason cases in asserting that
propaganda amounts to Treason under the aid and comfort prong and makes no
mention of “levying war” against the United States.
Attorney General Paul J. McNulty emphasized the potential harmful effects of
propaganda: “The significance of the propaganda part should not be underestimated.
This is a very significant piece of the way an enemy does business, to demoralize the
troops, to encourage the spread of fear.” 20 His response shows the effects-based theory
of aid and comfort as it asserts that the standard for determining whether a defendant
provided aid and comfort to America's enemies depends on the propaganda's effect on
the United States. The problem with the Gadahn indictment is that the courts are unsure
as to what constitutes “aid and comfort” in the propaganda context. The lack of clarity
about what constitutes “aid and comfort” leaves the government great leeway in
bringing treason prosecutions against political dissenters, whose statements might
provide aid to the United States' enemies in only an indirect manner. Under the World
War II precedents, there is no logical limit preventing an “aid and comfort” Treason
charge against someone in the United States who speaks the same words as Gadahn.
Without a clear definition of aid and comfort that encompasses those who work for an
enemy to produce propaganda but excludes those who engage in political dissent by

20

Eichensehra, supra note 15 at 232 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29].
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independently agreeing with, but not working with, the enemy, Treason may be
expanded indefinitely 21.
4. Treason prosecuted overseas: the duty of allegiance and citizenship
requirement
The prosecution of a native or naturalized American citizen for Treason
committed within the borders of the United States does not raise a jurisdictional
problem. But Treason committed overseas is a different matter. The law punishes as
traitors those who adhere to the enemies of the United States within the country or
elsewhere. The “elsewhere” is a source of great confusion.
a. “Axis Sally” and “Tokyo Rose”
In December 1941, simultaneously with the declaration of war, Mildred Gillars or
“Axis Sally” executed a paper which contained the words “I swear my allegiance to
Germany.” 22 On the basis of this paper, which was never produced, she urged the jury
to be instructed that if they found this to be a sufficient renunciation of citizenship, they
should acquit. The court refused to give the instruction, and the conviction was affirmed.
The court reasoned that there was no evidence that the paper had been sworn to before
anyone, or that there was any connection between it and any procedure having to do
with obtaining citizenship. Nor did it find any substance to Axis Sally’s argument that her
citizenship had ceased when her United States passport, submitted for renewal in 1941,

21

Gadahn, supra note 20 at 233 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21].
Mildred Elizabeth Gillars (November 29, 1900 – June 25, 1988), nicknamed "Axis Sally" along with Rita Zucca, was
an American broadcaster employed by the Third Reich in Nazi Germany to proliferate propaganda during World
War II. She was convicted of treason by the United States in 1949 following her capture in post-war Berlin.
22
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had been retained by the consular agent. A passport is some evidence of citizenship but
concluded the court, its absence does not deprive an American of his citizenship.
A second argument advanced in favor of successful expatriation under the
Nationality Act of 1940 was advanced by Iva D'Aquino, the “Tokyo Rose” of the Pacific
theater. 23 She noted that under the expatriation provisions of the Act, a person was
permitted to shed his allegiance to the United States and by doing so, could engage in
adherence, aid and comfort to the enemy with impunity. She argued that to try her for
Treason for acts which the law permitted others to do was unreasonable and arbitrary
and was a denial of due process under the Fifth Amendment. But the court found no
basis for this contention and concluded it was no more than a mere play on words. 24
It can be concluded that an American may avoid his natural loyalty to his country
through an act of voluntary expatriation. But the mere fact that such person purports to
verbally or informally renounce his citizenship or purports to pledge his allegiance to any
enemy state, without complying with its formal requirements, will not excuse the crime
of Treason. Before allowing a citizen to adhere to our enemies the courts will force a
compliance with the statutes dealing with expatriation even for a person with a dual
nationality status. 25

23

Iva Toguri, better known as “Tokyo Rose,” was born in Los Angeles on July 4, 1916. After college, she visited
Japan and was stranded there after the attack on Pearl Harbor. Forced to renounce her U.S. citizenship, Toguri
found work in radio and was asked to host “Zero Hour,” a propaganda and entertainment program aimed at U.S.
soldiers. After the war, she was returned to the U.S. and convicted of treason, serving 6 years in prison
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
24
Loane, supra note 8 at 66 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
25 Id [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 32].
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B. Aiding the Enemy
1. Definition of Aiding the Enemy
Under Section 104 of the UCMJ, Aiding the Enemy is defined as any person who
(1) aids, or attempts to aid, the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies, money, or other
things; or (2) without proper authority, knowingly harbors or protects or gives
intelligence to, or communicates or corresponds with or holds any intercourse with the
enemy, either directly or indirectly; shall suffer death or such other punishment as a
court martial or military commission may direct. This section does not apply to a military
commission established under chapter 47A of this title. 26
2. Relationship between Treason and Aiding the Enemy
The history of the Aiding the Enemy crime within the U.S. context dates back to
1775. The crimes of Aiding the Enemy and Treason were enacted by the first U.S.
Congress in 1760. 27 That act, often referred to as relating to “the crime of Treason,”
stated that “if any person or persons, owing allegiance to the United States of America,
shall levy war against them, or shall adhere to their enemies, giving them aid and
comfort with the United States or elsewhere ... such person or persons shall be
adjudged guilty of treason.” However, Congress later specifically intended to separate
Treason from Aiding the Enemy. This Congressional intent culminated when Congress
included Article 104 within the original UCMJ in 1950. Thus, Aiding the Enemy under
Article 104 is a separate offense from Treason. This Congressional action provides
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evidence that Treason is essentially one option for the government to use in levying
charges against those who both assist the enemy against the United States and hold an
allegiance or duty to the United States such as citizenship. 28
3. Aiding the Enemy Under Section 104 of the United Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ)

Article 104 has criminalized Aiding the Enemy since the UCMJ's inception in
1950. This charge is unique within the confines of traditional military law because the
statutory language specifically authorizes trial via court-martial or military commission.
Based on the language of case law, it is easy to conclude that Congress specifically
intended the charge of Aiding the Enemy to be available to military prosecutors when
conducting military commission proceedings. Article 104's recent history only bolsters
this conclusion. The UCMJ version of Aiding the Enemy has only been amended once,
in 2006, when Congress stated the section does not apply to a military commission
established under chapter 47A. Thus, the Aiding the Enemy charge as laid out in the
new MCA 2006 became the only legally sanctioned method for prosecuting
Guantanamo Bay detainees available at the time. That bright-line exclusion of Article
104 seemed to be the end of the situation until a few years later with the approval of
MCA 2009 that ultimately served to repeal MCA 2006. 29 The MCA 2009 failed to
maintain the exclusion of UCMJ Article 104, and thus Congress effectively restored

28
29

Leibowitz, supra note 27 at 136 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].
Id [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31].

18

Article 104's scope back to its historic statutory language. As a result, the current UCMJ
authorizes an Aiding the Enemy charge via any type of military commission.
4. Choosing how to prosecute under UCMJ 104: the prosecutor’s
dilemma
Theoretically, when prosecuting war criminals, military trial attorneys could
bypass a military commission altogether and instead take the accused to a court-martial
as Article 104 does assert jurisdiction over “any person.” 30 A court-martial could better
avoid the inherent politics and delay surrounding the military commission process.
However, the negative view is the same logic that led to the creation of military
commissions in the first place in terms of evidentiary issues and better protecting
classified assets. Once a potential court martial gets to the referral stage relating to a
violation of Article 104, a convening authority is required. The Office of Military
Commissions (OMC) has its own appointed convening authority tasked with approving
all referrals of charges. But the OMC convening authority is limited to military
commissions and would not have jurisdiction to authorize a court martial. Therefore, the
authority for a Guantanamo Bay detainee would likely be the admiral overseeing Joint
Task Force Guantanamo. If the Guantanamo Bay authority approves charges against a
detainee under Article 104, military trial counsel may seek a judicial opinion. The
rationale is that the UCMJ has not been used in such a straight battlefield manner
involving an enemy force. The judicial opinion would need to grant additional leeway in
regard to the rules of evidence because of the in-depth intelligence inherent in a military
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commission but typically alien to the vast majority of courts-martial. But overall,
bypassing a military commission for courts-martial may be tactically sound but would
likely remain impractical due to the nature and scope of the evidence involved in such
cases. 31
5. Duty of allegiance confusion under the UCMJ section 104 for the
crime of Aiding the Enemy
Although Article 104 appears to afford military commission prosecutors an
additional choice of law regarding an Aiding the Enemy charge, the duty of allegiance
seems to have worked its way back into the crime. During post 9/11 litigation involving
the military commission process, the subject of Aiding the Enemy has arisen involving
Guantanamo Bay detainees. 32 Moreover, the government charged Guantanamo Bay
detainees Omar Khadr and David Hicks with Aiding the Enemy before the MCA 2006. 33
Between the federal civil litigation and the Khadr and Hicks charges, the duty of
allegiance was introduced as being an element to UCMJ Article 104.This notion has its
roots in confusion over the similarly situated historic Treason statute, despite either the
lack of case law applying UCMJ Article 104 to alien combatants or its post-World War II
predecessor with judicial overlay or additional common law elements. Adding to the
confusion, Aiding the Enemy cases prosecuted during the Civil War, Philippine
Insurrection, and Seminole War were not consistent in addressing the issue of loyalty,
allegiance or Treason. 34 In 2004, in United States v. Hicks, the defense sought to
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dismiss the Aiding the Enemy charge by tying it to the allegiance requirements
contained in the Treason and Aiding the Enemy language of the Articles of War of
1775. 35 However, the issue was not tried since the government withdrew all charges
against Hicks. The Aiding the Enemy charge against Khadr suffered a similar fate, and
once the government was allowed to refile charges in that case, prosecutors decided
not to use the Aiding the Enemy charge.
6. The creation of a related crime of Wrongfully Aiding the Enemy
under Military Manual for Commissions supports the conclusion UCMJ 104
has no duty of allegiance
Congress authorized prosecutors to use a MMC alternative, a charge called
“Wrongfully Aiding the Enemy.” 36 While this crime follows the same statutory guidelines
as its UCMJ counterpart, the MMC crime requires one significant additional element
absent from UCMJ Article 104. This crime explicitly required that the accused detainee
must be “in breach of an allegiance or duty to the United States,” defining that
“allegiance” or “duty” as “citizenship, resident alien status, or a contractual relationship
in or with the United States.” Therefore, based solely on the statutory language, military
commission prosecutors seeking to charge an accused terrorist operative with Aiding
the Enemy have the option of avoiding the MMC's strict allegiance requirement by
simply reverting back to the UCMJ. 37 In fact, the UCMJ appears to provide jurisdiction to
apply Article 104 to a detainee otherwise chargeable under the overall MCA 2009,
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stating, “This article denounces offenses by all persons whether or not otherwise
subject to military law.” Offenders may be tried by court-martial or by military
commission. The forward to the MMC acknowledges that the military commission’s
rules are “adapted from the Manual for Courts-Martial.” 38 The foreword adds support
that the MMC applies the procedures and rules from courts-martial unless otherwise
noted .This statement bolsters the conclusion that the MMC version of Wrongfully
Aiding the Enemy was meant be treated as a distinct crime from UCMJ 104 Aiding the
Enemy.
7. Prosecutor’s choice between the MMC crimes of Wrongfully Aiding
the Enemy and UCMJ Aiding the Enemy is aided by a three part test
In determining whether to prosecute under the MMC Wrongfully Aiding the
Enemy crime or the UCMJ Article 104 Aiding the Enemy crime a three-part test is an
effective tool. 39 The first step is to assess the detainee's immigration status. If the
detainee is a lawful permanent resident or holds himself out as a resident alien based
on the stated belief that his “green card” is still valid, then the government can
prosecute under the MMC version of Aiding the Enemy. The second step looks at where
the detainee was seized. If the detainee were seized within the United States, then he
has adopted a duty to the United States based on the immigration paperwork used to
gain country access. For an accused captured overseas, the third step requires
reviewing any substantial connections to the United States that the detainee had during
his alleged assistance to the enemy. The “substantial connections” element of this test
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is valuable because in other contexts courts have found that overseas aliens held a
sufficient nexus to the United States to merit certain Fifth Amendment trial rights. 40 For
example, al-Aqeel v. Paulson involved a Saudi citizen deemed to have a “sufficient
nexus with the United States” based on factors including frequent travel to the United
States, acquiring property in Missouri and his being president of an Oregon corporation.
In this case, al-Aqeel was allowed to enjoy some additional trial rights based on his
substantial U.S. contacts, although the court denied his attempts to gain Fourth
Amendment benefits. 41 Because the MMC defines the allegiance or duty requirement as
having some duty to the United States, applying the substantial connections test may
well be appropriate for an MMC wrongfully aiding the enemy charge.
C. Material Support for Terrorism
1. Definition of Material Support for Terrorism
Under 18 U.S. Code § 2339A, Material Support for Terrorism is defined as
whoever provides material support or resources or conceals or disguises the nature,
location, source, or ownership of material support or resources, knowing or intending
that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of various
sections section 42 or in preparation for, or in carrying out, the concealment of an escape
from the commission of any such violation, or attempts or conspires to do such an act,
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shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the
death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. 43
2. Differences between the crimes of Aiding the Enemy and
Material Support for Terrorism.
Accepting that Congress intended to provide military commissions prosecutors
with a choice when it comes to an Aiding the Enemy charge does not end the inquiry.
To truly understand the landscape requires examining the difference between an
Aiding-the-Enemy charge and a charge of providing Material Support for Terrorism.
Both UCMJ Article 104 and the material support charge contain similar elements
relating to the aid and support of an enemy, but they differ. 44
The primary difference is imbedded directly into the titles of these respective
articles. The material support charge is limited to “terrorism,” while in the charges of
Aiding the Enemy, terrorism is inconsequential because the assistance only needs to be
on behalf of “the enemy.” More specifically, the MMC when describing the elements of
the crimes requires either assisting in a planned “act of terrorism” or intentionally
providing support or resources to “an international terrorist organization engaged in
hostilities against the United States. 45 In contrast, the charges of Aiding the Enemy
have a much wider scope. For a prosecutor, however, the utility is a scope expanded to
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include virtually anybody operating in hostile opposition to the United States. The
government could then charge an accused terrorist with both offenses.
3. Domestic background and prosecution of Material Support for
Terrorism
The term “material support” first appeared in federal legislation in the 1990
Immigration and Nationality Act. 46 Sponsored by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the INA
was a reform of U.S. immigration laws. 47 While domestic law already excluded aliens
from the United States who “engage in terrorist activity,” the INA expanded this scope.
Under the INA, it was now permissible to exclude an alien from the United States if that
individual had committed an act of providing material support to a terrorist organization.
While significant, this milestone in the development of the material support provisions
merely precluded aliens from gaining admission to the United States rather than
criminalizing the support activities of American citizens. That later development would
be brought on by the attack against the United States by al Qaeda. 48 The United States
first passed laws criminalizing the provision of material support for foreign terrorist
organizations in 1993. In 2001, after the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the USA
PATRIOT Act, which broadened the definition of “material support” as well as “terrorism”
to include domestic acts. 49
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4. Military Commissions may only prosecute crimes classified as
violations of the Laws of War.
To prosecute an accused in a military commission, the commission must have
subject matter jurisdiction over the charges. 50 Military commissions derive their authority
pursuant to Congress's enumerated power to define and punish offenses against the
law of nations. Consequently, commissions' jurisdiction is limited to those offenses
which are violations of the Laws of War. If a military commission were to try a crime
other than a law of war violation, it would overreach its jurisdiction. This fact is
recognized by the Judicial, Legislative and Executive branches.
Defining Law of War
The Law of War is the “customary and treaty law applicable to conduct of warfare
on land and to relationships between belligerent and neutral states. 51 Violations of the
Law of War are deemed war crimes. War crimes came to prominence after World War II
and were created to hold Nazi party members responsible for violations of the
international laws and customs of wars. Specifically, Article 6 of the Charter of the
Nuremburg International Military Tribunal gave jurisdiction over those who had
committed war crimes. 52 American jurisprudence has required a consistently
established precedent in determining what constitutes a war crime. In 2004, for
example, the Supreme Court held that actionable violations of international law must be
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of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory. Two years later, grappling with
whether conspiracy was a violation of the law of war, the Hamdan plurality held that
such precedent must be by “universal agreement and practice.” 53 Additionally, the Court
held that the Government must make a substantial showing that the crime for which it
seeks to try a defendant by military commission is acknowledged to be an offense
against the Law of War. Analysis of this issue begins by determining what body of law is
encompassed by the term “Law of War”. 54 The Supreme Court's precedents tell us: The
“law of war” referenced in 10 U.S.C. § 821 is the international law of war. 55

5. Material Support for Terrorism as a war crime under the Military
Commissions Acts
Military commissions continue to charge suspected terrorists with the offense of
providing Material Support to Terrorism. In order understand that offense it is helpful to
view it in the larger context of the nation's response to 9/11 attacks. The Authorization
for Use of Military Force (AUMF), passed just days after the 9/11 attacks, provided the
basis for what would become the Bush Doctrine, that those who support terrorism at
any level are as guilty as those carrying out the attacks. 56 President Bush's Order in
November 2001 authorizing military commissions, provided the venue for which the
charge of material support could bring the Bush Doctrine to completion. After the
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Supreme Court held that the initial military commission system contravened the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Congress responded by enacting the 2006 Military
Commissions Act, concluding that terrorism as a method of armed conflict was a
modern day war crime and a practice contrary to the law of nations. Congress later
passed a revised MCA in 2009. 57
The Military Commission Acts of 2006 and 2009 and Material Support
for Terrorism
Both the 2006 and 2009 MCAs addressed the crime of material supporting
terrorism, which the previous statutory treatment of international war crimes did not
address. In particular, section 950v(b)(25) of the 2006 MCA made punishable the
offense of providing material support or resources to those who have engaged in
hostilities or who have purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the
United States. It applies to those who have provided “material support or resources to
an international terrorist organization or engaged in hostilities against the United States.
The 2006 MCA thus “clarified the scope of the Executive's authority to try war crimes,”
adding crimes that include conspiracy and material support for terrorism to the
international law of war. 58
According to the MCA, military tribunals may exercise jurisdiction over any alien
unlawful combatant, defined as either “a person who has engaged in hostilities or who
has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its cobelligerents,” or a person who has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant
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for other reasons. 59 The MCA also grants military commission jurisdiction over any
offense made punishable by the MCA or the law of war when committed by an alien
unlawful enemy combatant before, on, or after September 11, 2001. Such offenses,
according to the MCA, include murder of protected persons, attacking civilians,
pillaging, taking hostages, employing poison or similar weapons, torture, improperly
using a flag of truce, rape, and providing material support for terrorism. Accordingly, the
MCA indicates that a military commission has personal jurisdiction over a defendant
who has “materially supported hostilities against the United States even though such an
act does not by many accounts violate international law.

60

6. Material Support for Terrorism is not a War Crime under the Laws of
War
The MCA attempts to take measures that would allow military commissions to
exercise jurisdiction over defendants for acts other than those crimes internationally
recognized as war crimes. Specifically, the MCA grants military commissions authority
to try unlawful enemy combatants for the crime of Material Support for Terrorism.
Provisions that expand the jurisdiction of commissions beyond war crimes are
unconstitutional and overstep international law norms as well as United States
precedent that limit military commissions to trying only violations of the Laws of War.
Thus, the question arises in light of the Military Commissions Act and the military
tribunal convicting Hamdan for providing material support for terrorism, is providing
material support for terrorism legitimately categorized as a war crime, for which the
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United States may try a defendant by military tribunal, or should it exclusively be
considered a crime under domestic law. 61 Notwithstanding a pair of decisions by the
Court of Military Commission Review, the charge of material support for terrorism
cannot be said to constitute a violation of the laws of war. Consequently, military
commissions have no jurisdiction over that charge. Yet Congressional restrictions in the
2011 and 2012 National Defense Authorization Acts make military commissions the only
vehicle for trying many suspected terrorists.
Under Hamdan, when Hamdan committed the relevant conduct from 1996 to
2001, Section 821 of Title 10 provided that military commissions may try violations of
the “law of war.” 62 The Law of War cross-referenced in that statute is the international
law of war. 63 When Hamdan committed the conduct in question, the international law of
war proscribed a variety of war crimes, including forms of terrorism. At that time,
however, the international law of war did not proscribe material support for terrorism as
a war crime. Therefore, the relevant statute at the time of Hamdan's conduct—10
U.S.C. § 821—did not proscribe material support for terrorism as a war crime. 64 After
his release, Hamdan nonetheless continued to appeal his U.S. military commission
conviction. On appeal to the en banc Court of Military Commission Review, Hamdan
argued that Congress lacked authority under Article I of the Constitution to make
Material Support for Terrorism a war crime triable by military commission; and that the
statute in effect at the time of his alleged conduct—10 U.S.C. § 821, which limited
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military commissions to violations of the “law of war”—did not authorize prosecution of
Material Support for Terrorism as a war crime. In 2011, the Court of Military
Commission Review affirmed the conviction. 65
However, there is much additional support for the conclusion that Material
Support for Terrorism is not a war crime. First, there are no relevant international
treaties that make material support for terrorism a recognized international law war
crime. Neither the Hague Convention nor the Geneva Conventions acknowledge
Material Support for Terrorism as a war crime. 66 Nor does customary international law
otherwise make material support for terrorism a war crime. Customary international law
is a kind of common law; it is the body of international legal principles said to reflect the
consistent and settled practice of nations. 67 Customary international law results from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation. 68 Although customary law is often difficult to interpret, here, the content of
customary international law is quite evident.
In addition, the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which
catalogues an extensive list of international war crimes, makes no mention of material
support for terrorism. 69 Nor do the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, or the Statute of the
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Special Court for Sierra Leone. 70 In addition, no international tribunals exercising
common law power have determined that Material Support for Terrorism is an
international law war crime. Also, the offense of material support for terrorism is not
listed in the JAG handbook on the law of war. So, neither the major conventions on the
law of war, nor prominent modern international tribunals, nor leading international law
experts have identified Material Support for Terrorism as a war crime. Finally and
importantly, before this case, no person has ever been tried by an international law war
crimes tribunal for material support for terrorism.
Other sources indicative of customary law also fail to allude to the provision of
material support as a war crime. The Nuremberg Charter specifically addresses
violations of the customs of war but does not list material support. 71 A United Nations
Special Rapporteur went so far as to conclude that providing material support for
terrorism goes “beyond offences under the law of war, and even a congressional
research service report has found that defining material support of terrorism as a war
crime “does not appear to be supported by historical precedent.” Additionally, the United
States War Crimes Act does not list material support as a war crime nor is its definition
of “war crime” broad enough to include material support. 72

70

Statute of the Int’l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N.S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR 48th Sess., 3217
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by Security Council
on 8 November 1994, U.N. Doc. S/ RES/955 (1994).; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138
(2002) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13].
71 Charter of the Nuremburg International Military Tribunal, August 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544 [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 2].
72
War Crimes Act, 18 U.S. Code § 2441, 2006 [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 18].

32

However, either a court martial or an Article III federal court, both of which provide
the procedural protections needed when trying a defendant who is not accused of
committing a war crime, have the appropriate jurisdiction needed to try Material Support
for Terrorism. Additionally, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which makes Material Support for
Terrorism a violation of domestic law, specifically grants extraterritorial jurisdiction in
situations where the defendant is brought into or found in the United States.
IV.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper analyzes the practical differences and issues in prosecuting
the crimes of Aiding the Enemy under article 104 of the UCMJ, the Wrongfully Aiding of
the Enemy crime under the MMC, Treason, and Material Support for Terrorism.
Although, navigating the different crimes can be confusing this paper attempts to
analyze how these different but related crimes are to be prosecuted in order to aid the
military prosecution. The crimes viewed together can be seen as different tools in a
prosecutor’s tool box.
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